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Permitting limited admission of polygraph evidence in a hearing upon a
motion for new trial is a novel compromise between the strict evidentiary
standard of general scientific acceptance and the liberal rules of relevant
evidence. Barbara preserves the sanctity of the trial from a "questionable
device," but permits the court to test the utility of the polygraph under
strictly controlled conditions. If the polygraph fails to demonstrate its
reliability in gauging witness sincerity within the confines of new trial
hearings, the Barbara court has limited adequately the effect of its decision
through the numerous conditions imposed on the permissible use and pur-
pose of such evidence.62 Conversely, if the polygraph succeeds in demon-
strating its reliability in assessing witness credibility, the Frye standard of
general scientific acceptance should be satisfied and the door properly
opened to the general admission of polygraph evidence for impeachment
purposes.
MICHAEL MORRIE JONES
Labor Law-Shopping Kart: The Need for a Broader Approach
to the Problems of Campaign Regulation
In accordance with its authority under the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act to regulate union election campaigns,1 the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has developed a complex set of election standards to protect
employee "freedom of choice" 2 in voting for or against union representa-
tion. The Board conceives of free choice not simply as an uncoerced
refusal to submit to a polygraph examination. Cf. People v. Towns, 69 Mich. App. 475, 245
N.W.2d 97 (1976) (improper for trial court to induce defendant to take polygraph test prior t1
sentencing even though court told defendant that refusal to take the test would not affect the
sentence); People v. Allen, 49 Mich. App. 148, 211 N.W.2d 533 (1973) (improper to ask
defendant if he were willing to take a polygraph test).
62. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
1. Section 9(c)(1) of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. §
159(c)(1) (1970), states in part, "[If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a
question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the
results thereof." The Supreme Court interpreted a similar provision under § 9(c) of the National
Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 453 (1936), to give the Board authority to
promulgate regulations necessary to conduct a fair election. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316
U.S. 31, 37 (1942); NLRB v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940).
2. Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 223 (1962).
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choice,3 but also as one that is "informed" and "reasoned.', 4 To promote
such rational decisionmaking by employees, the Board seeks in the elections
it supervises to "provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be
conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible." 5 This "laboratory
conditions" ideal has provided a rationale under which the Board has
developed extensive rules for determining when conduct or speech by either
employer or union will be grounds for setting aside an election. 6 As part of
this development, for over two decades the Board has held that a substantial
misrepresentation by either side that could be found to have had a probable
impact on the election would be a sufficient basis for invalidating an election
and ordering another. 7 In an unexpected decision8 in April, 1977, however,
the Board reversed this long-standing policy and declared in Shopping Kart
Food Market9 that it will no longer probe into the truth or falsity of
campaign statements, or set aside elections on the basis of alleged misrepre-
sentations. 10 Beyond its effect of deregulating one facet of election prac-
tices, Shopping Kart illustrates the limitations of the Board's adjudicative
approach to policymaking and the desirability of the Board's effectuating
any further changes in its campaign regulations in a comprehensive, rather
than piecemeal, manner.
3. Coercion of employees is expressly prohibited under § 8(a)(1) of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970), which makes any action that
interferes with, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of their rights under § 7 of the
Act, id. § 157, an unfair labor practice. Section 7 provides that employees have the right of self-
organization and the right to form or join labor organizations.
4. The Board has stated:
Our function. . . is to conduct elections in'which the employees have the opportunity
to cast their ballots for or against a labor organization in an atmosphere conducive to
the sober and informed exercise of the franchise, free not only from interference,
restraint, or coercion violative of the Act, but also from other elements which prevent
or impede a reasoned choice.
Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 70 (1962).
5. General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).
6. See text accompanying notes 24-33 infra.
7. Notable cases in the Board's development of controls over misrepresentations include
United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953) (election invalidated when one union fabricated
a letter from the president of a second union admitting election misconduct and praising the first
union), and Gummed Products Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1955) (election set aside because of
union's misrepresentation concerning wages negotiated with another employer). See text ac-
companying notes 29-33 infra.
8. The Board did not indicate before Shopping Kart Food Market, 228 N.L.R.B. No.
190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (Apr. 8, 1977), that it was considering a reevaluation of its long-standing
policy on misrepresentations. Thus, counsel for both sides were not able to submit briefs or
orally argue the merits of the policy change. Motion for Reconsideration I (copy on file in office
of North Carolina Law Review). Following the Board's decision, counsel for both the employer
and the union argued that the record should be reopened for oral and written argument on the
change in policy. Id.; Brief in Reply to Employer's Motion for Reconsideration (copy on file in
office of North Carolina Law Review).
9. 228 N.L.R.B. No. 190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (Apr. 8, 1977).
10. Id. at -, -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705, 1708.
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In Shopping Kart, a union official told employees on the day preceding
the election that the employer had earned profits of $500,000 in the past
year, although actually they had totalled only $50,000.11 The employer lost
the election and challenged the results, alleging that the misrepresentation
had caused the union's victory. The Regional Director, applying the Board's
policy on misrepresentations as articulated in Hollywood Ceramics Co. ,12
according to which only material misrepresentations would invalidate an
election, found that the misrepresentation was not material. 13 The Board,
although agreeing with the Regional Director that the union should be
certified, determined in a three to two decision to overrule Hollywood
Ceramics altogether.
14
In the majority opinion, Board members Penello and Walther argued
that the Board's painstaking, subjective determinations of the probable
impact on employees of election misrepresentations had resulted in inconsis-
tent rulings, an increased number of objections and a delay in the final
outcome of elections. 5 The problem of delay had been exacerbated, they
noted, by the frequent refusal of the courts to enforce Board decisions,
which had encouraged parties to litigate to the fullest.' 6 The majority
contended that the negative effects of Board control over misrepresentations
could no longer be justified since an influential empirical study had shown
that employees are not influenced by election campaigns anyway. 17 Thus,
they concluded, "[Tihe Hollywood Ceramics rule operates more to frustrate
free choice than to further it and. . . the purposes of the Act would be
better served by its demise."' 8 Although ex-Chairman Murphy joined
Penello and Walther in overruling Hollywood Ceramics, she stated in a
concurring opinion that she will continue to vote to set aside elections in
which a party makes an "egregious mistake of fact."' 19 The three members
11. Id. at-, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705.
12. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962); see text accompanying notes 29-33 infra.
13. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705. The Regional Director found that the union
official had neither actual nor imputed knowledge of the employer's profits. Id.; see note 38 and
text accompanying notes 32 & 33, 38-41 infra.
14. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705.
15. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1706-07. The majority also criticized the Hollywood
Ceramics policy for its effect of restricting free speech. Id. Although this has been a major
criticism leveled at the Board in connection with this policy, see note 28 infra, the Shopping
Kart majority did not emphasize the issue.
16. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
17. Id. The empirical study relied on by the majority is discussed in notes 64, 71-76 and
text accompanying notes 64-76 infra.
18. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R R.M. at 1708.
19. Id. (concurring opinion). Unfortunately, Murphy did not define any standard for an
"egregious" misrepresentation except by negative implication. She stated that she would find
such election interference "only in the most extreme situations" and would not set aside
19781
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were in total agreement, however, in holding that the Board would continue
to invalidate elections on the basis of forgeries and misrepresentations
involving Board processes.
20
In a strongly worded dissent, members Fanning and Jenkins argued that
it was only through its regulations that the Board maintained a high standard
of campaign conduct in a majority of elections 21 and that the Board's
abandonment of its regulatory role would lead to an increase in propaganda
and misrepresentations. 22 The dissent also attacked the behavioral study that
the majority relied on to support its decision.
23
The policy established in Shopping Kart of not examining the sub-
stance of campaign representations is not new to the Board. Between 1935
and 1947, the Board intervened only rarely in cases of union misrepresenta-
tions; employers, on the other hand, were held to a standard of strict
neutrality.24 In 1947, Congress, in an attempt to ensure greater latitude to
employers in speaking against unionization in election campaigns, adopted
section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which removed most speech from the
ambit of unfair labor practices. 25 In response, in General Shoe Corp. 26 the
Board held that section 8(c) applied only to unfair labor practices, and that
campaign speech would continue to be subject to regulation under the
Board's section 9(c) 27 power over election practices, regardless of any
elections on the basis of "gross errors" or examine statements "for mere truth or falsity." Id.
As examples of elections she would not set aside, Murphy cited two cases involving gross wage
misrepresentations by unions. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708-09 (citing Contract Knitter, Inc.,
220 N.L.R.B. 579 (1975); Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp., 220 N.L.R.B. 210 (1975)).
20. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708 (majority & concurring opinions).
21. Id. at-, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709 (dissenting opinion).
22. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710 (dissenting opinion).
23. Id. at-, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709-10 (dissenting opinion). For a discussion of this study,
see notes 64, 71-76 and text accompanying notes 64-76 infra. Board member Jenkins dissented
further on the basis of his disagreement with the conclusions of the study. 228 N.L.R.B. at-,
94 L.R.R.M. at 1712.
24. See R. WILLIAMS, P. JANUS & K. HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELEcTION CONDUCT
17-19 (Univ. of Pa. Wharton School Labor Relations and Public Policy Series No. 8, 1974)
[hereinafter cited as WILLIAMS]; Christensen, Free Speech, Propaganda and the National Labor
Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 243, 255-63 (1963). See Note, Limitations upon an Employ-
er's Right of Noncoercive Free Speech, 38 VA. L. REV. 1037 (1952), for a compilation of cases
that enforced the policy of strict employer noninterference.
25. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970)
provides:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof,
whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence
of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of § 8(c), see Koretz, Employer Interfer-
ence with Union Organization Versus Employer Free Speech, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399
(1960).
26. 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
27. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970),
quoted in note 1 supra.
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immunity under section 8(c). 28 This policy was subsequently applied to both
employers and unions.
After 1947, the Board, through case-by-case adjudication, gradually
established a set of criteria to be used in judging the impact of a misrepre-
sentation on an election. 29 These criteria were summarized by the Board in
1962 in Hollywood Ceramics Co. ,3o which became the definitive statement
of the Board's misrepresentation policy:
We believe that an election should be set aside only where
there has been a misrepresentation or other similar campaign trick-
ery, which involves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time
which prevents the other party . . . from making an effective
reply, so that the misrepresentation, whether deliberate or not,
may reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the
election . ... But even where a misrepresentation is . . . sub-
stantial, the Board may still refuse to set aside the election if it
finds. . . that the statement would not be likely to have had a real
impact on the election. For example, the misrepresentation might
have occurred in connection with an unimportant matter. . . . Or,
it could have been so extreme as to put the employees on notice of
its lack of truth. . . Or, the Board may find that the employees
possessed independent knowledge with which to evaluate the state-
ments.
31
An additional consideration, which had been articulated in previous cases,
32
was added in a footnote to Hollywood Ceramics3 -whether the informant's
knowledge of the subject matter that was misrepresented was so special that
it would induce employees to attach unusual significance to the misstate-
ment.
In applying the Hollywood Ceramics standards, the Board has had to
make a series of subjective determinations in every case; as a result, Board
28. 77 N.L.R.B. at 126, 127; see WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 19-20; Christensen, supra
note 24, at 258-62.
The General Shoe policy has been frequently attacked by Board critics. A Senate report
found that the Board's regulation of campaign speech under § 9 is "in conflict with the spirit of
section 8(c)" and noted that "the idea that speech of any kind, much less 'protected speech' can
invalidate an election is unacceptable outside of labor law, and is dubious within it." Excerpts
from the Report of the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 120 CONG. REC. 11304 (1974). But see Wirtz, The New National Labor Relations
Board; Herein of 'Employer Persuasion, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 594, 612-16 (1954) (use of the
banner of freedom of speech to characterize employers' expressions of opinion to their
employees about unionization is misleading).
29. See, e.g., Kawneer Co., 119 N.L.R.B. 1460, 1461 (1958); Calidyne Co., 117 N.L.R.B.
1026, 1028 (1957); Gummed Products Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 1093-94 (1955); Merck & Co.,
104 N.L.R.B. 891, 892 (1953); WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 20-25.
30. 140 N.L.R.B. 221 (1962).
31. Id. at 224 (footnotes omitted).
32. See, e.g., Gummed Products Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 1094 (1955).
33. 140 N.L.R.B. at 224 n.10.
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decisions in misrepresentation cases have been inconsistent and frequently
have been overturned by the courts.14 Evaluating the substantiality of a
misrepresentation has required the Board to decide what degree of departure
from the truth in each case is actually significant.3 5 When a misrepresenta-
tion has been judged to be substantial the Board then has had to decide how
much time was needed for an effective rebuttal, and, in cases in which the
opposition has not responded to the misrepresentation, whether it could have
so responded. 36 Determining the materiality of a misrepresentation has
involved the Board in difficult examinations of the relative importance of
the issues in each campaign. 37 Finally, in considering the credibility of the
source of the misrepresentation and employees' knowledge about the subject
of the misrepresentation, the Board has had to evaluate the employees' state
of mind and receptivity.38 The Board has said numerous times that it does
not look for evidence of employees' actual knowledge, 39 but instead makes
34. See WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 28-61; Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in
Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REv. 38, 82-90
(1964).
35. The subjectivity inherent in this type of determination has led to inconsistency in
application. See WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 28-33; Bok, supra note 34, at 84-86. Compare,
e.g., Cross Baking Co., 186 N.L.R.B. 199 (1970), rev'd, 453 F.2d 1346 (1st Cir. 1971) (wage
misrepresentation amounting to 15 cents an hour was not substantial), with Kawneer Co., 119
N.L.R.B. 1460 (1958) (union's representation that hourly wages elsewhere were $1.81 and
vacation time was two weeks when actually wages ranged from $1.73 to $1.90 and vacation time
was one week was substantial) and Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1962) (inference fostered by
employer that union dues were five dollars a month whan they were actually four dollars a
month was substantial).
36. For examples of Board-court disagreement over the application of the timing stan-
dard, see Aircraft Radio Corp. v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1975) (Board and court reached
different conclusions on effectiveness of employer's rebuttal to a prior union misrepresenta-
tion); NLRB v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 455 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1972) (Board and court applied
different standards concerning responsibility of employer to investigate and respond to union's
misrepresentation made four days prior to election); WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 39-46.
37. The Board and the courts have frequently disagreed in applying the materiality
standard. See NLRB v. Santee River Wool Combing Co., 537 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir. 1976) (Board's
finding that false assertion by union that one employee had been illegally discharged was
immaterial since the company had in fact illegally discharged other employees reversed);
Luminator Div. of Gulton Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972) (Board's decision
that union misrepresentation of wages and benefits received under a different contract was
immaterial reversed); NLRB v. Graphic Arts Finishing Co., 380 F.2d 893 (4th Cir. 1967)
(Board's determination concerning the materiality of claims about union strike benefits set
aside); WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 33-39.
38. One study of Board decisions in this area has found that:
[Trhe Board's decisions reflect a fundamental ambivalence as to how much emphasis
should be placed upon the voters' own abilities to recognize campaign propoganda for
what it is and either disregard it or take independent steps to verify it before voting in
reliance thereon. In some cases, the Board appears to have regarded the employees as
exceptionally naive and in need of extensive protection from the agency. In others, the
Board has seemed willing to impose a high degree of responsibility on the voters...
to protect themselves from being misled by campaign claims.
WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 57.
39. Pinkerton's Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B. 1076, 1077 n.3 (1959); 41
NLRB ANN. REP. 66 (1976). See also Bok, supra note 34, at 40 n.8; Note, Behavioral and Non-
Behavioral Approaches to NLRB Representation Cases, 45 IND. L.J. 276, 284 (1970).
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its own judgment, based on its "administrative expertise," as to what
employees might reasonably be expected to know. 4° Though this approach
has maximized the Board's administrative flexibility, it has done so at the
sacrifice of a clearly defined standard.41
The subjectivity of the determinations inherent in the application of the
Hollywood Ceramics standards has given the courts of appeals the latitude
to make independent factual determinations in misrepresentation cases,
42
despite pleas from the Board that such determinations are more properly
within the purview of its administrative powers.43 The courts also have at
times refused to apply all the standards,' or have applied additional stan-
dards, 45 and have sometimes enforced the standards with a rigidity explicitly
40. Modine Mfg. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 527 (1973), enforced, 500 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1974).
41. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 48. The fact that earlier Board decisions focused on the
actual special knowledge of the source of the misrepresentation whereas later cases looked
more to the reliance of employees has also impeded formulation of a clear standard in this area.
Id. at 46-51. Different Board members often apply different formulations of the standard and
arrive at different results. See, e.g., Cumberland Wood & Chair Corp., 211 N.L.R.B. 312
(1974). In some cases, the Board has applied the earlier test, focusing on the actual knowledge
of the speaker, but the courts, setting aside orders, have reached different results based on a
standard that focuses more on reliance. See NLRB v. A.G. Pollard Co., 393 F.2d 239 (1st Cir.
1968); WILLIAMS, supra at 46-51.
The Board has further contributed to the confusion at times by failing to look to the source
of the misrepresentation when it would be appropriate. See, e.g., Medical Ancillary Servs.,
Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 582, 583 (1974) (Penello dissenting) (majority set aside an election because
of misleading statements made by a union stewardess who did not occupy a position of
authority or have any special knowledge about the matters at issue).
Board member Jenkins has at times apparently ignored the source factor in overturning
elections. See, e.g., Ereno Lewis, 217 N.L.R.B. 239 (1975); Medical Ancillary Servs., Inc., 212
N.L.R.B. 582 (1974). However, in Shopping Kart, Jenkins and Fanning stressed the impor-
tance of the source factor in concluding that, even under Hollywood Ceramics, the election
should not be overturned. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709.
42. See, e.g., Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974);
Walled Lake Door Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1973); Luminator Div. of Gulton
Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. G.K. Turner Assocs., 457 F.2d
484 (9th Cir. 1972); Cross Baking Co. v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 1346 (Ist Cir. 1971).
43. There must be a reasonably flexible and not too constrained or rigidly controlled
area left for administrative expertise in determining, in the best judgment we can
muster from our knowledge and experience in the field, and in the exercise of sound
administrative discretion, what circumstances justify either invalidating an election or
holding a hearing on misrepresentation issues.
Modine Mfg. Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 527, 530 (1973), enforced, 500 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1974).
44. In particular, the courts have resisted considering whether the source had special
knowledge, and whether the employees' independent knowledge would largely counter the
misrepresentation, on the grounds that these considerations allow the guilty party to escape
unpunished. See LaCrescent Constant Care Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 510 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir.
1975); Henderson Trumbull Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 1224 (2d Cir. 1974); NLRB v.
Millard Metal Serv. Center, Inc., 472 F.2d 647 (Ist Cir. 1973); WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 54.
45. See, e.g., NLRB v. Santee River Wool Combing Co., 537 F.2d 1208, 1211 (4th Cir.
1976) (considering the element of deliberateness or intentionality in determining the effect of
the misrepresentation on employees); Aircraft Radio Corp. v.NLRB, 519 F.2d 590, 593-94 (3d
Cir. 1975) (considering both deliberateness and the closeness of the original election vote);
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rejected by the Board in Hollywood Ceramics.46 These conflicts between
the Board and the courts have resulted in an enforcement rate in misrepre-
sentation cases that is much lower than the enforcement rate for Board
decisions in general. 47
An examination of the measurable effects of the Board's past regula-
tion of misrepresentations shows that the negative results have outweighed
the benefits. Although Hollywood Ceramics objections to elections have not
necessarily become routine as implied by the majority in Shopping Kart,
48
the number of objections based on alleged misrepresentations have con-
stituted a large proportion of post-election objections. 49 Very few of these
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 1136, 1139-41 (5th Cir. 1971) (stressing the element
of the deliberateness of the misrepresentation).
46. The Board expressed a realistic view of election campaigning in Hollywood Ceramics:
We are. . . aware that absolute precision of statement and complete honesty are not
always attainable . . . . Election campaigns are often hotly contested and feelings
frequently run high. At such times a party may, in its zeal, overstate its own virtues
and the vices of the other without essentially impairing "laboratory conditions."
140 N.L.R.B. at 223-24. This view has not been consistently followed by either the Board or the
courts. See WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 28-33; Bok, supra note 34, at 88. The classic statement
of an idealistic approach to elections was made in a case that predated Hollywood Ceramics:
"If truth is diluted, it is no longer truth. A glass of pure water is no longer pure if a one-ninth
part thereof is contaminated, nor is it 'virtually' pure. There cannot be 'virtually' the truth any
more than there can be 'virtually' a virgin." Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 261 F.2d 613,
616 (7th Cir. 1958).
One reason for the courts' rigidity may be the perception by the courts of a pro-union bias
on the part of the Board. WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 57-59; see Automation & Measurement
Div., The Bendix Corp. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 141, 146 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Lord Baltimore
Press, Inc., 370 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1966).
47. The courts have refused to enforce 51.1% of the Board's decisions in misrepresenta-
tion cases; in contrast, the set-aside rate for Board decisions in general is 14.7%. Speech by
Peter Walther to State Bar Ass'n of Texas (June 17, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Walther],
reported in [1977] LAB. L. REP. (CCII) 9126A, at 15,474.
48. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1706 (citing WILLIAMS, supra note 24, at 60). The
criticism by the majority does not seem to be well founded. As the dissent noted, 300 to 400
yearly challenges based on misrepresentations out of a total of approximately 9,000 elections
indicates that challenges are not routine. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710 (dissenting opinion).
49. According to ex-Board member Walther, employer objections based on misrepresen-
tations constituted I of every 4 employer election objections filed in fiscal year 1976. Walther,
supra note 47, reported in [1977] LAB. L. REP. (CCII) 9126A, at 15,473. However, since
employers filed 223 misrepresentation objections, Shopping Kart, 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94
L.R.R.M. at 1710 (dissenting opinion); see note 50 infra, out of a total 493 election objections,
41 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 39, at 232 app., table I IC, it appears the ratio is closer to I out
of 2. Of the 678 union election objections in 1976, id., 84 were based on alleged misrepresenta-
tions. Shopping Kart, 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710 (dissenting opinion); see note 50
infra.
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objections, however, have been sustained.50 Furthermore, the number of
changed outcomes resulting from rerun elections has been even smaller.
51
By far the most significant practical effect of the regulation of misrepresen-
tations has been the delay in obtaining final results in challenged elections;
in 1976 final election results were delayed by litigation from 286 days to 4
years. 52 Any advantage a union gains from such litigation53 is relatively
slight compared to what an employer gains. As ex-Board member Walther
50. Misrepresentations alleged to Percent of objections
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228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710 (dissenting opinion).
51. In 1976, 18 rerun elections were ordered in response to union objections and 8 in
response to employer objections. Walther, supra note 47, reported in [1977] LAB. L. REP.
(CCH) 9126A, at 15,473. In fiscal year 1976, approximately 40% of all rerun elections resulted
in outcomes different from the original election. 41 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 39, at 232
app., table I IC. Therefore, the 26 reruns probably yielded 10 or 11 changed outcomes.
52. Misrepresentation cases that eventually reach the courts of appeals require lengthy
litigation since Board determinations involving representation questions cannot be directly
appealed. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 411 (1940). Therefore, if a union brings a misrepresen-
tation charge and loses, the union cannot appeal. When an employer brings a misrepresentation
charge and loses, the union is certified. The employer, however, can refuse to bargain with the
victorious union and be found guilty of an unfair labor practice. On appeal of the unfair labor
practice finding, all questions, including those involving the original representation election, are
reviewable by the courts. Id. at 409-12.
In 1976, the 9 misrepresentation cases that went to the courts of appeals for enforcement of
Board orders were not decided until 1 1/2 to 4 years after the elections were originally held.
Although unions won in 5 of the 9 appeals, the time delay was sufficient to dissipate the union's
bargaining power. Lengthy delays also occurred in the 37 summary judgment bargaining orders
issued by the Board in misrepresentation cases. Walther, supra note 47, reported in [1977] LAB.
L. REP. (CCH) 9126A, at 15,473. Even the fully contested misrepresentation cases that were
not appealed were, on the average, decided by the Board 286 days after the original election.
Speech by John Fanning before American Bar Ass'n in Chicago (Aug. 9, 1977), reported in
[1977] 95 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 381, 384. Thus, even for cases not appealed to the courts, the
time consumed in fully contesting a misrepresentation charge and conducting a rerun probably
approximated a year, which coincides with the time established by statute after which a
defeated union can obtain a new election in any event. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970).
53. A union might be interested in filing an unwarranted objection so as to maintain an
employee nucleus at a partially organized plant. Samnff, NLRB Elections: Uncertainty and
Certainty, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 228, 242 (1968).
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has observed, "[I]f effectuation of a certification can be delayed a year or
more . . . the union's following is dissipated and its strength at the bar-
gaining table nil."
54
Given the problems in application and enforcement of the Hollywood
Ceramics standards and the negative side effects of prolonged litigation, it
seems that the maintenance of the regulatory standards would be justifiable
only if they in fact have had a deterrent effect. Neither the majority nor the
dissent, however, analyzed the probability or strength of such a deterrent
effect. The majority side-stepped the issue by contending that employees are
not influenced by misrepresentations anyway. 55 The dissent, on the other
hand, assumed without question that the standards had successfully deterred
misrepresentations in ninety-five percent of the elections conducted in the
past year.56 The validity of this assertion is debatable considering the
vagueness of the standards and their subjective and often inconsistent
application. 57 The articulation of the standards on a case-by-case basis rather
than in clearly enunciated rules of general applicability probably has also
minimized their deterrent effect. 58 In addition, the impossibility of deterring
unintentional, careless or unauthorized misstatements, and the use of tactics
such as rumor-spreading, were not recognized by the dissent. 59 Given these
considerations, it is likely that undetected violations have occurred in
numerous elections60 and that more objections have not been filed because
54. Walther, supra note 47, reported in [1977] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 9126A, at 15,473. An
employer is also encouraged to file an objection by considerations of the possible money
savings that might accrue if bargaining is delayed and of the increased possibility of success if
the case eventually is appealed to the courts. See Bok, supra note 34, at 87; Samoff, supra
note 53, at 237.
55. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707. The majority implied that since employees
are not influenced by misrepresentations it is unnecessary to deter misrepresentations. This
proposition is questionable, however, since the conclusions of the study cited by the majority
for the proposition that employees are not influenced by campaign misrepresentations, see note
64 and text accompanying notes 64-67 infra, were based on studies of elections conducted
under the Hollywood Ceramics standards. It is arguable that these standards generally helped to
deter gross misrepresentations in the elections studied and that, were employees subjected to
totally unregulated campaigning, there would be a greater impact on employee voting. See
Miller, The Getman, Goldberg and Herman Questions, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1170 (1976).
56. 228 N.L.R.B. at-, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709-10 (dissenting opinion). One Board critic has
described such faith as an "unwarranted confidence in the capacity of the law." Samoff, supra
note 53, at 247.
57. See notes 35-38, 41 and text accompanying notes 34-41 supra.
58. See Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rulemaking Dilemma Under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571, 590 (1970); Bok, supra note 34, at 92; Peck, The
Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729, 759
(1961); Wirtz, supra note 28, at 616.
59. See Bok, supra note 34, at 86, 87 & n.132 (rumor-spreading is an effective, unre-
gulated way of communicating misinformation). See also Samoff, supra note 53, at 240.
60. This conclusion is supported by data showing that employees reported campaign
violations in as many elections that the Board later found to be "clean" as in those that the
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of the cost and the improbability of success upon Board review. 61 Despite
the improbability that the Board's standards have, in fact, acted as an
effective deterrent, the majority's remedy of total deregulation of campaign
speech would seem less drastic and be more defensible had the Board
considered testimony from unions and management concerning the actual
deterrent effect of the now-discarded regulations.
62
Although considerations of inconsistent results, Board-court conflict
and prolonged litigation were important factors motivating the Shopping
Kart decision, these considerations were all articulated in 1973 when in
Modine Manufacturing Co. 63 the Board expressly declined to overrule
Hollywood Ceramics. Thus, the key to the Shopping Kart decision appears
to lie in the reexamination of the behavioral assumption underlying
Hollywood Ceramics: that employees are actually influenced by campaigns.
This reexamination apparently was provoked, at least in part, by an influen-
tial empirical study of employee voting behavior (the Getman study)' 4
which found, following an examination of thirty-one elections in five
midwestern states, that eighty-one percent of the employees surveyed voted
according to their precampaign attitudes and intent,65 and that, in general,
employees did not remember most campaign issues.66 From this and other
data, the authors of the study concluded that employees are generally
inattentive to campaigns, and that their vote is not determined by informa-
tion received during campaigns.
67
Influential observers of the Board have long noted the need for an
empirical study of employee behavior that would test the behavioral as-
Board later overturned. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG, & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION
ELECTIONS: LAW AND REALITY 117-18 (1976) [hereinafter cited as GETMAN].
61. See note 50 supra.
62. Testimony might have shown, for example, that standards of election behavior with
regard to misrepresentations are largely self-imposed. See note 89 and accompanying text infra.
63. 203 N.L.R.B. 527, 529-31 (1973), enforced, 500 F.2d 914 (8th Cir. 1974).
64. GETMAN, supra note 60. The study also appeared in two parts: Getman & Goldberg,
The Behavioral Assumptions Underlying NLRB Regulation of Campaign Misrepresentations:
An Empirical Evaluation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 263 (1976), and Getman, Goldberg & Herman,
NLRB Regulation of Campaign Tactics: The Behavioral Assumptions on Which the Board
Regulates, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (1975).
The purpose of the study was to determine the effect of the pre-election campaign on
employee voting behavior. The authors' staff interviewed 1,239 employees who voted in 31
elections. Employees were interviewed as soon as possible after the beginning of the campaign
to ascertain their attitudes toward the union and the employer and their voting intent. The
second interview, conducted after the election, determined actual vote, issues remembered and
reasons given for voting choice. GETMAN, supra at 33.
65. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 53-64, 72.
66. Id. at 73-85.
67. Id. at 53-64, 73-85, 140-41.
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sumptions underlying the Board's campaign regulations. 68 The Board's
willingness to reexamine its regulations now that such a study has been done
must be commended. The treatment afforded the study in Shopping Kart,
however, illustrates the need for a more thorough analysis and scrutiny of
the data and a more cautious application of the study's results. The majority
accepted uncritically the study's conclusions,6 9 despite conflicting data that
indicates that campaign speech may affect a significant minority of elec-
tions, perhaps a large enough number to warrant its continued regulation in
some form. For example, as the dissent noted, half the employees polled
were aware of union claims concerning wages elsewhere, and 22% recalled
the precise amount within 10%.70 Although the authors of the study con-
cluded that the average employee was not "very" familiar with campaign
issues,71 the averaging of employee recognition of significant issues with
insignificant ones arguably underemphasizes the consistent salience of cer-
tain key issues such as prospective plant closings, loss of benefits and
possible discharges (employer issues), and wages and working conditions
(union issues) that were recognized by 23 to 71% of all employees. 72 In
addition, the study's finding that union campaigns did in fact influence
voters who were exposed to them,73 and the extensive shifting of votes in the
most successful union and company campaigns74 suggest that at least some
campaigns probably have an effect. By ignoring this data and other weak-
68. See Bernstein, supra note 58, at 582; Bok, supra note 34, at 40,46-53, 88-90; Samoff,
supra note 53, at 233 n.15, 245.n.41; Summers, Politics, Policy Making, and the NLRB, 6
SYRACUSE L. REV. 93, 106-08 (1955).
69. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707.
70. Id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1710 (dissenting opinion); see GETMAN, supra note 60, at 82,
71. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 107. The average employee could remember only 10% of
the company campaign issues and 7% of the union issues. Id. at 76.
72. Eight employer issues concerning loss of benefits, improvements not being dependent
on unionization, union dues and the destructive effects of unionization were recognized by 25
to 40% of the employees. Id. at 78-79. Six union issues generally concerning wages, working
conditions, benefits, grievances and union gains obtained elsewhere were recognized by 23 to
71% of the employees. Id. at 80-81. Additionally, certain issues were of critical importance in
individual campaigns, being recognized by as many as 89% of the employees. Id. at 82-83.
73. Among voters who were initially undecided and those who switched from one party to
the other, those who voted for the union were significantly more familiar with the union
campaign than were those who voted for the company, but those who voted for the company
were no more familiar with the company campaign than were those who voted for the union. Id.
at 103-09. This suggested to the authors a causal relationship between attendance at union
meetings, familiarity with the union campaign and vote switching to the union. Id.; see Eames,
An Analysis of the Union Voting Study from a Trade-Unionist's Point of View, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 1181, 1187 (1976).
74. In the five most successful company campaigns the average loss in union support from
the card-sign to the vote was 35%; in the most successful union campaigns, however, the unions
gained an average 10% from the card-sign to the vote. The authors could find no explanation for
these strong gains and losses. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 100-03; see Eames, supra note 73, at
1185-86; Miller, supra note 55, at 1164.
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nesses and inconsistencies in the study, 75 and selectively accepting the
study's conclusion concerning general employee behavior, the majority
avoided directly confronting several difficult issues.7 6 It did not have to
make the difficult value judgment concerning how many elections must be
shown to be affected by campaign tactics in order to justify Board regula-
tion. 77 Additionally, the majority did not have to consider whether the
Board's remedy of election invalidation is supported by any proof of the
Board's ability to identify those elections that have actually been influenced
by unfair campaigning.
7 8
75. A major weakness is that, although the votes of the 6% of the initially undecided
voters and the 13% of the voters who switched from one party to the other determined the
outcome of 9 of the 31 elections, GETMAN, supra note 60, at 103, the authors were unable to
determine what factors influenced the voters' decisions in those elections. Id. at 98; see Miller,
supra note 55, at 1168-69.
The study's conclusion that the campaign had no effect is inconsistent with the proposition
that the campaign probably strengthened latent voting predispositions, GEMAN, supra at 142,
since the strengthening of predispositions may be important in influencing employees' actual
votes. Miller, supra at 1187. In addition, the voting predispositions of a majority of employees
in some elections may be very weak because of lack of exposure to unions and absence of
strong feelings about the employer. In these elections the information received during the
campaign may have more impact on the voters' choice. See Flanagan, The Behavioral Founda-
tions of Union Election Regulation, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1195, 1199 (1976). With regard tb this
possibility, it seems significant that the majority of the voters studied by the Getman group had
had significant exposure to unions. GETMAN, supra at 66.
The conclusion that campaign violations do not influence voters is not consistent with two
previous studies of rerun elections that show that the probability of a different outcome in a
rerun depends, at least partially, on the type of violation reported in the first election. See
Drotning, NLRB Remedies for Election Misconduct: An Analysis of Election Outcomes and
Their Determinants, 40 U. Ci. J. Bus. 137 (1967); Pollitt, NLRB Re-run Elections: A Study, 41
N.C.L. REV. 209 (1963).
Despite these criticisms, the Getman study's general conclusions seem to be in accord with
other more limited studies of employee voting behavior. See Brotslaw, Attitude of Retail
Workers Toward Union Organization, 18 LAB. L.J. 149 (1967) (primary determinants of
employee voting are previous union experience, general perceptions about unions and job
satisfaction); Comment, An Examination of Two Aspects of the NLRB Representation Elec-
tion: Employee Attitudes and Board Inferences, 3 AKRON L. REV. 218 (1970) (positive experi-
ences with management, satisfaction with working conditions, and perception of personal job
security are most critical in voting choice).
For favorable responses to the Getman study, see Flanagarr, supra; Raskin, Deregulation
of Union Campaigns: Restoring the First Amendment Balance, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1175 (1976);
Goetz & Wike, Book Review, 25 U. KAN. L. REV. 375 (1977).
76. The dissent, in contrast to the majority, seized on the inconsistencies of the study and
seemingly rejected in toto its conclusions, 228 N.L.R.B. at -,-, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709-10, 1712
(dissenting opinions), thereby disregarding valuable information that, even if accepted only in
part or with reservations, suggests that some modification of the Board's misrepresentation
policy is needed.
The approaches of both the majority and the dissent illustrate that critical comment and
analysis from informed observers should be solicited before any further use of the study is
attempted. See Bernstein, supra note 58, at 582; note 89 and accompanying text infra.
77. See Miller, supra note 55, at 1168-69 (we do not demand a cost-benefit analysis for all
worthwhile regulations in society, so we should not necessarily demand one in this area).
78. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
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The majority's use of the Getman study in Shopping Kart also illus-
trates the danger that the study will be selectively applied by the Board in
isolated areas of its regulatory policy to overturn some election controls,
while others of equally questionable behavioral validity are preserved. This
type of selective use was apparent in the majority's decision to continue to
invalidate elections on the basis of forgeries and misrepresentations in which
one party has implied Board support for its position, 79 despite the fact that
the Getman study indicates that such tactics have no greater impact on
employee voting than do other campaign misrepresentations. 80 The decision
to continue to invalidate elections when Board neutrality has been misrepre-
sented probably reflects the high value placed on Board impartiality and the
desire to maintain respect for the Board's operations. 81 The majority should
have considered, however, whether some method of enforcement other than
election invalidation would be preferable in these cases, for overturning
elections in which misrepresentations have probably not affected the out-
come actually frustrates employee freedom of choice.
82
The decision to continue to invalidate elections on the basis of forgeries
seems to have been motivated by a misunderstanding of the Getman study,
although unarticulated considerations may have influenced the decision.
The majority argued that employees are generally sophisticated about cam-
paign misrepresentations but may be misled by misrepresentations made in
such a deceptive manner that even sophisticated voters could not recognize
their inaccuracy.8 3 In using the Getman study as support for the proposition
that employees are not influenced by campaign propoganda because they are
sophisticated, however, the majority distorted the study's conclusions and
disregarded the study's finding of employee inattentiveness to the cam-
paign. 4 It is also possible that the Board retained election regulations in
79. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708.
80. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 150-53; see text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
81. The Board readily overturns elections in which official documents have been repro-
duced by unauthorized parties, even if the actual impact on the election is doubtful. See, e.g.,
Rebmar, Inc., 173 N.L.R.B. 1434 (1968) (election invalidated because union had reproduced
Board's official election notice, despite the innocuous nature of the alteration); Allied Electric
Prods., Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 1270 (1954) (upheld policy against reproducing official ballot so as to
not imply Board support for any particular party).
82. See GETMAN, supra note 60, at 113-18, 155 (suggesting Board's inability to make
impact determinations, and need for remedies other than election invalidation that would be
triggered automatically by election misconduct without regard to whether the misconduct had
had an impact on the election).
83. 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708.
84. The majority's emphasis on employee sophistication, id. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1707,
implies a view of employees weighing and evaluating information in a rational manner. The
Getman study found, on the other hand, that employees' votes were largely determined by
general attitudes towards unions and attitudes about working conditions. GETMAN, supra note
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cases involving forgeries because of the greater justification in punishing
such deliberate and intentional behavior85 and the relatively greater ease in
determining when such violations have occurred. As with the decision
concerning violations of Board neutrality, however, the majority should
have considered other means of deterring such behavior than election invali-
dation.
-The inadequacy of the Board's analysis of the Getman study in Shop-
ping Kart and the apparent unwillingness of both the majority and the
dissent to consider other approaches to campaign speech regulation, aside
from the general retention or abandonment of the Hollywood Ceramics
rules, illustrates the limitations of the Board's traditional adjudicatory ap-
proach to problems more amenable to rulemaking.8 6 That policy analysis of
the type attempted in Shopping Kart is better conducted in accordance with
established rulemaking procedures8 7 rather than through adjudication has
been suggested by numerous Board critics. 8 The primary advantage of a
rulemaking approach is that it generally opens up the decisionmaking
process, thereby providing an opportunity for wide participation to all
interested parties and helping to assure a variety of inputs. 89 It also offers
60, at 54-64, 72. These findings, and the additional finding of employee inattentiveness to the
campaign, suggest that employee voting behavior, although not irrational, does not involve the
rational intake of new information in the sophisticated manner implied in the majority interpre-
tation of the study. Id. at 143.
85. The courts have often considered the element of intentionality. NLRB v. Santee River
Wool Combing Co., 537 F.2d 1208 (4th Cir. 1976); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d
1136 (5th Cir. 1971).
86. Rulemaking, as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act, is a process for "for-
mulating, amending, or repealing" an "agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." 5 U.S.C. §
551(4), (5) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The NLRB has preferred to develop substantive rules
through adjudication, even when general rules of widespread applicability have been ar-
ticulated. See Peck, supra note 58, at 736-40.
87. Section 6 of the Labor Management Relations Act authorizes the Board to "make,
amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter." 29 U.S.C.
§ 156 (1970); see note 89 infra.
88. See generally Baker, Policy by Rule orAd Hoc Approach-Which Should It Be?, 22 L.
& CoNTEMP. PROB. 658 (1957); Bernstein, supra note 58; Peck, supra note 58; Peck, A Critique
of the National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation: Adjudication and
Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 254 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Peck, A Critique]: Samoff,
Coping With the NLRB's Growing Caseload, 22 LAB. L.J. 739 (1971); SAMOFF, supra note 53;
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965); Note, Administrative Law Making Through Adjudication:
The National Labor Relations Board, 45 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1961).
89. Rulemaking procedures include publication in the Federal Register of general notice of
the proposed rulemaking and hearing, a statement of the proposed substance of the suggested
rule, an opportunity for interested parties to submit written data and arguments with or without
oral presentation, and publication in the Federal Register of the rule as adopted. 5 U.S.C. §
553(a)-(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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greater flexibility in considering alternatives other than merely upholding or
overruling precedent. 90 For example, with regard to the difficulties of
regulating campaign misrepresentations noted in Shopping Kar, the critical
problem of prolonged litigation could have been considered in light of
possible administrative and procedural changes such as increasing the power
of Regional Directors and commensurately decreasing the scope of Board
review. 91 As an alternative to general deregulation, the Board could have
Although, as one critic has noted, following a rulemaking procedure will not in itself
guarantee that the Board actually will consider the opinions and testimony elicited, Bernstein,
supra note 58, at 593, such a procedure would at least ensure that a variety of opinions is
presented. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974); Bernstein, supra at 591, 616-
18; Peck, supra note 58, at 756-57; Peck, A Critique, supra note 88, at 263; Shapiro, supra note
88, at 932. Such participation was notably lacking in Shopping Kart since the impending
reconsideration of Board policy was unannounced. See note 8 supra. Analysis of the type
described above may be critical with regard to the Getman study considering its unique nature,
its scope and its potential impact on other areas of Board election regulation. See text accom-
panying notes 64-78 supra. Participation of affected parties increases the probability that
defects in proposed rules will be noted before the rules are adopted. Peck, A Critique, supra at
272, and that interrelationships with other rules will be studied, Bernstein, supra at 591.
Additionally, "[Iln rulemaking, all potentially affected have the opportunity to shape the initial
decision before the agency attitude hardens, whereas adjudication often burdens nonparties
with persuading the agency to overrule or modify a precedent." Id.
The proposed Labor Reform Act of 1977, H.R. 8410, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). passed
by the House of Representatives on Oct. 6, 1977, 123 CoO. REC. HI0,713 (daily ed. Oct. 6,
1977), and awaiting Senate action in 1978, requires the Board to make rules governing when
election misconduct will be grounds for election invalidation. H.R. 8410 § 5, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977). See 123 CONG. REC. H10,702-14 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1977); id. H10,630-79 (daily ed.
Oct. 5, 1977); and id. H10,540-63 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1977) for debate on the various provisions
of the bill.
90. See Peck, A Critique, supra note 88, at 272.
91. Limiting the scope of Board review and reducing court review of Board decisions
would tend to accelerate ultimate resolution of cases. Both possibilities, of course, would be
strongly opposed by some parties on grounds of due process. As Chairman Fanning has noted,
"One man's unconscionable delay is another's due process. Where one shades into the other is
a perception much influenced by where you sit." Speech by John Fanning, supra note 52,
reported in [1977] 95 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA), at 383.
The proposed Labor Reform Act, discussed at note 89 supra, includes various provisions
that would ameliorate the difficulty in achieving final results in disputed elections within a
reasonable time. The provisions include setting time limits for parties to appeal adverse Board
decisions, cutting back, though not eliminating, court review of Board decisions involving
certification and increasing the number of Board members from five to seven. H.R. 8410 §§ 2,
6, 9, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
The special task force appointed to investigate and recommend changes in NLRB proce-
dure considered various procedural changes that would accelerate the filing procedure on
objections, increase the burden on the objecting party to show substantiating evidence at an
early stage in the objection process, allow for parties to waive the right of review, eliminate as a
basis for review the ground that a substantial factual issue was clearly decided erroneously and
increase the power of Regional Directors to issue decisions in all cases subject to limited
review. INTERIM REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHAIRMAN'S TASK FORCE ON THE
NLRB FOR 1976, at 18-30 (1976).
The Board also could reduce the possibility of parties using its regulations in order to delay
bargaining by providing for expedited review of objections brought by parties with a history of
filing objections.
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established threshold requirements for Board intervention in misrepresenta-
tion cases, thereby eliminating Board intervention in numerous cases, set-
ting clearer guidelines for election conduct and preserving Board control in
cases in which misrepresentations are most likely to have an impact.
92
A rulemaking approach would also have enabled the Board to consider
each facet of its election controls within the context of a comprehensive and
complementary regulatory scheme. Comprehensive policy examination of
this nature is impelled by the Getman study93 and by the fact that the Board's
regulation of other campaign practices has produced many of the same
problems as its now-discarded controls over misrepresentations. 94 Moreov-
er, the Board's policies in various areas of campaign regulation are intimate-
ly connected and therefore should be considered together. For example, the
policy of providing unions limited access to employer premises serves a goal
similar to that of the Board's regulation of campaign misconduct: both
policies have as their overriding purpose the effectuation of a free and
informed voter choice. 95 Abandonment of controls over misrepresentations
might have been more justifiable had the Board concurrently taken positive
action to provide unions with equal access to employer premises96 -a step
92. One threshold suggested by the results of the Getman study is for the Board to
consider only cases in which the margin of victory is smaller than 20%. GETMAN, supra note 60,
at 150 n.21; see Bok, supra note 34, at 91. Such a policy is supported by studies indicating that
the original margin of victory is the most important factor in determining whether there is a
different outcome in a rerun election. See Drotning, supra note 75, at 142; Pollitt, supra note
75, at 220.
The Board also could refuse to hear claims concerning misrepresentation made within
three working days of the election, thereby putting greater responsibility on the parties them-
selves to police the campaign. Additionally, the Board could refuse to examine ambiguous
statements, see Bok, supra at 91, and any misrepresentation made to less than a Board-
determined percentage of the employees in a unit. It could also limit review to misrepresenta-
tions about certain key issues, absent substantial proof by the complaining party that a unique
or usually minor issue was important in a given campaign. See GETMAN, supra at 78-79, and
note 72 and accompanying text supra, for a summary of which issues are generally important in
campaigns. These thresholds could be determined in light of the Board's 25 years of experience
with misrepresentation charges.
93. The study recommends deregulation of speech, including threats and promises, misre-
presentations, interrogation, emotional appeals and speeches made to massed groups of em-
ployees within 24 hours of the election. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 146-50.
94. The Board's regulation of inflammatory, emotional appeals, illegal threats and prom-
ises and illegal discharges, among others, requires that the Board make very subjective determi-
nations concerning either motive or impact. For the problems of making impact judgments, see
notes 37-38, 41, 44-47 and text accompanying notes 34-47 supra.
95. The Board's policy of requiring employers to disclose names and addresses of their
employees is predicated on the policy of enhancing the probability of a free and reasoned
choice. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
96. The need for greater access is shown by the Getman study's finding that, although
unions were furnished with employees' names and addresses and could conduct meetings off
the employer's premises, employee exposure to the union campaign was significantly less than
employee exposure to the company campaign. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 96, 143-44, 156-59.
Many commentators have advocated greater union access to employer premises as an alterna-
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supported both by considerations of fairness and by the desirability of
maximizing the opportunity to rebut misinformation. 97 Significantly, in
Shopping Kart the Board ignored the fact that the Getman study's recom-
mendations with regard to deregulation were made in the context of other
proposals advocating equal access to company premises 98 and stronger
remedies for other types of campaign misconduct. 99
The outlines of the Board's new policy of not examining alleged
campaign misrepresentations are still somewhat unclear given ex-Chairman
Murphy's failure to more precisely define standards for the "egregious"
misrepresentations that will continue to be grounds for setting aside an
election.'0 Indications are, however, that Board intervention will occur
only when the misrepresentation approaches actual fraud.' 0' If Shopping
Kart is not overruled,' 2 the primary effect of the decision will be to
eliminate a basis for objection to election results that has been used to
unduly prolong litigation and delay bargaining in hundreds of cases every
year. The decision also eliminates the need for the Board to make difficult
impact determinations in one category of election cases. There is, however,
the possibility that the general deregulation of election speech will result in
an escalation of propaganda in some elections, though probably only a
minority. In cases in which such an escalation occurs, unions will probably
be at a decided disadvantage because their access to employees is generally
more restricted than is management's, and thus their opportunity to rebut is
more limited.
Despite these potential problems, Shopping Kart illustrates a healthy
willingness on the part of the Board to reexamine, on the basis of new
behavioral data, long-held assumptions and the policies they have previous-
tive to strict campaign regulation. See Bok, supra note 34, at 91-92; Samoff, supra note 53, at
239, 248-50. A provision mandating that the Board formulate rules providing for greater union
access to employees is included in the proposed Labor Reform Act of 1977. H.R. 8410 § 3, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), discussed at note 89 supra.
97. See GETMAN, supra note 60, at 157; Bok, supra note 34, at 52-56, 91-92.
98. GETMAN, supra note 60, at 157; see Speech by Stephen Goldberg to Labor Relations
Law Section of ABA (Aug. 6, 1977), reported in [1977] 95 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 390
(Goldberg, co-author of the Getman study, emphasized the fact that the suggested changes
were not to be considered in isolation).
99. See GETMAN, supra note 60, at 113-18, 151-55; Speech by Stephen Goldberg, supra
note 98.
100. See note 19 supra.
101. In a case arising after Shopping Kart, Murphy indicated that an "egregious" mistake
of fact might have to amount to fraud in order to invalidate an election. Thomas E. Gates &
Sons, Inc., 229 N.L.R.B. No. 100, at - n.6, 95 L,R.R.M. 1198, 1199 n.6 (May 17, 1977).
102. Since Shopping Kart was decided, Peter Walther resigned from the Board and was
replaced by John Truesdale, who, along with Fanning and Jenkins, could constitute the
majority needed to overrule Shopping Kart.
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ly supported. It is also encouraging that the established misrepresentation
policy was overturned on the basis of the Board's experience with the
practical consequences of the Hollywood Ceramics rules rather than as a
result of political changes in the Board's composition.1 3 The decision, in
conjunction with the challenge to the foundation of existing campaign
regulations presented by the Getman study, 104 raises the possibility that the
Board will reexamine other election regulations that exhibit many of the
characteristics of the Hollywood Ceramics standards. 105 Shopping Kart
demonstrates, however, that such a reexamination should be made only after
a more thoughtful analysis of the Getman study. Shopping Kart also
illustrates the desirability of effectuating any further changes in existing
campaign standards through rulemaking proceedings, rather than through
adjudication. Such an approach would provide a wider forum for discussion
and analysis of the Getman study and of controversial changes. A rulemak-
ing approach would also allow for the establishment of regulatory priorities,
the consideration of remedies other than election invalidation, the alteration
of administrative and procedural practices where necessary and the concur-
rent examination of the issue of access and other means of promoting the
goal of enhancing informed voter choice.
KAREN SINDELAR
103. Most policy changes effected by the Board have resulted from changes in the Board's
composition. See Bernstein, supra note 58, at 597; Wirtz, supra note 28, at 611-12. This has
been especially true in the politically sensitive area of "free speech." Hickey, Stare Decisis and
the NLRB, 17 LAB. L.J. 451, 462 (1966).
104. See note 93 supra.
105. See note 94 supra. Although the Board may not be willing to eliminate its election
regulations to the extent suggested by the Getman study, the rationale of Shopping Kart, that
employees are generally sophisticated enough to protect themselves from campaign propagan-
da and that employees are largely uninfluenced by such propaganda anyway, would at least
support the abandonment of other regulations justified only by the General Shoe doctrine,, see
note 28 and text accompanying notes 26-28 supra, rather than by specific statutory prohibition.
For example, despite the majority's express indication that it will continue to oversee campaign
conduct other than misrepresentations, 228 N.L.R.B. at -, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708, it is difficult
to see how the Board can continue to overturn elections on the basis of appeals to racial or
religious prejudices, see, e.g., Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66 (1962).
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